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Europe of Networks or the European Public Sphere? 
Four plus One Approaches
Santrauka. Pagrindinė straipsnyje plėtojama idėja yra ta: užuot siekę įrodyti, kad Europoje egzistuoja 
viešoji erdvė, arba, priešingai, kad viešoji erdvė ar viešosios erdvės dar nesusiformavusios, turėtume žvelgti 
į Europą kaip į daugialypių tinklų darinį. Šiuose tinkluose – daug savitų viešųjų erdvių. Koncepcija, kuri 
viešąją sritį siūlo tirti remiantis daugialypių tinklų idėja, kritiškai vertina tradicinį Jürgeno Habermaso po­
žiūrį, kuris traktuoja viešąją sritį kaip darinį, iš esmės ribojamą nacionalinių sienų. Socialiniai ir kultūriniai 
tinklai plėtojami visose gyvenimo srityse. Laikui bėgant, jie bręsta, kinta, gerokai išsiplečia. Šiandieną sunku 
aiškiai skirti įvairius tinklus, kurie tinkamai funkcionuoja vietiniame, nacionaliniame, transnacionaliniame, 
regioniniame, viršregioniniame, taipogi ir globaliame, lygmenyse. Vis dėlto, remiantis demokratijos teorijos 
principais, svarbu apibrėžti erdvines skirtingų tinklų formas, nes jos visos nusako skirtingus demokratinės 
politikos modalumus. Demokratija vietiniame arba nacionaliniame lygmenyse turi būti traktuojama kitaip, 
negu demokratija transnacionaliniame arba globaliame lygmenyse. 
Keywords: European public sphere, social networks, European communication policy.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Europos viešoji erdvė, socialiniai tinklai, Europos komunikacijos politika.
1. Introduction
The main argument in this article is that 
instead of attempting to establish the existence 
or the non-existence of the European public 
sphere or public spheres, we could think of 
Europe as consisting of a multiplicity of net-
works, each having a public sphere or spheres 
of their own.1 These networks operate in all 
areas of life, but most fundamentally they 
are social and cultural in their origin. These 
networks have developed, transformed, and 
vastly expanded in time. It is difficult to make 
clear distinctions between different networks 
today as they can operate locally, nationally, 
trans-nationally, regionally, trans-regionally 
as well as globally. However, from the point of 
view of democratic theory it is still important 
to make a distinction between these different 
spatial embodiments of networks, as they all 
indicate different modalities for democratic 
polities. Democracy needs to be thought dif-
ferently on a local or national scale than on 
the trans-national or global scale. 
1  This article is written as a part of the research project “European Public Sphere(s): Uniting and Dividing”, 
funded by the Academy of Finland (2005–2007). See http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eupus/.
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The idea of seeing the public sphere from 
the point of view of networks is critical to 
the traditional idea of conceiving the public 
sphere as something intrinsically restricted to 
national boundaries (Fossum and Schlesinger 
2007; Nieminen 2006). In terms of the deve-
lopment of the national public sphere, for ex-
ample, that started to get shape in Finland in 
the late 19th century, it was a very complex set 
of networks – personal, family-tied, educa-
tion-bound, professional, social and cultural 
ties – which formed the basic fabric for the 
emergence of national public life. 
Applying a network-based approach to 
the Habermasian type of historical narrative, 
the national public sphere started to get es-
tablished and institutionalised in the form of 
public debates by civic associations and news-
papers. From the network point of view, this 
always took place through and against of the 
pre-publicity of social and cultural networks. 
Publicly exercised critical-rational debates 
can be understood in terms of publicised 
contests between different networks – or, 
in other terms, between elite groups against 
each other. The emerging national state estab-
lished the framework for this contestation; it 
was in the framework of the resources avai-
lable – economic, social, cultural, administra-
tive – that the competition between the net-
works was exercised.
Until the early 2000s, the problem with 
most theorising on the public sphere was that 
it had not much to say about the precondi-
tions for the public sphere transgressing the 
national boundaries – transnational, regional, 
European or global public spheres. The situa-
tion has now, however, rapidly changed, and 
the European public sphere has become a hot 
topic for research.
2. A European Public Sphere?
In the last years academic literature on 
the European public sphere has been ex-
panding. A number of research projects – 
smal ler and bigger ones – have been estab-
lished around the European public sphere, 
many of them funded by the European Un-
ion (Schlesinger 2007, 66–67).2 In a sense, 
an academic industry has developed around 
that topic. However, although there have 
appeared numerous different ways to ap-
2  Some of the projects can be listed here as an example – and also in order to show the area of their interest: 
• AIM: Adequate Information Management in Europe. (http://www.aim-project.net/index.php?id=4; retrieved 
24.10.2007) 
• CIDEL: Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in Europe. (http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/index.html; 
retrieved 24.10.2007)
• EMEDIATE: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the “War on Terror“. 
(http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EMEDIATE/Index.shtml; retrieved 24.10.2007) 
• EUROPUB.COM: The Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public 
Spheres. (http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/knowledge/projects/article_3479_en.htm; retrieved 
24.10.2007) 
• Eurosphere: http://www.eurosphere.uib.no/about.php 
• IDNET: Europeanization, Collective Identities, and Public Discourses. (http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
scien ces/knowledge/projects/article_3501_en.htm; retrieved 24.10.2007)
RECON: Reconstituting Democracy in Europe. (http://www.arena.uio.no/recon/; retrieved 24.10.2007) 
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proach the European public sphere, its ana-
lytic definition has remained surprisingly 
vague – and its research seems still to suffer 
of rather a non-reflexive application of what 
is called the Habermasian ideal­typisch way 
of understanding what the public sphere is 
about (Fossum and Schlesinger 2007).
2.1 Notion of Public Sphere
In the course of years the public sphere 
has been defined in a number of different 
ways. As it is customarily remarked, the term 
“Public Sphere” – with capital letters – be-
gan to appear in the Anglo-American media 
and communication research originally in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The term was adopted 
from the English translations of the texts by 
Jürgen Habermas as an English correlative 
for the term Öffentlichkeit (Kleinstüber 2001). 
For Habermas, the public sphere is the basic 
functional principle in a democratic society 
and it refers to the ideal of democratic com-
munication. In a Habermasian sense, the ideal 
of the public sphere is characterised by the 
following principles:
•  access to public debate is free and open 
to everybody,
•  all participants in public debate are con-
sidered as equal,
•  no subjects and topics are excluded from 
the debate,
•  the result of public deliberation is judged 
only on the basis of best arguments
•  the aim of the debate is consensus and 
unanimity (Habermas 1989; 36–37; 
Cal houn 1992b; Roberts and Crossley 
2004).
Today there is a more or less shared 
consensus among the research community 
that the “really existing” public sphere does 
not correspond to these ideal claims, if it ever 
has. Despite this, the ideal notion still has a 
strong influence in almost all academic dis-
cussions on public sphere or public spheres. 
The reason for this is probably that the ideal 
notion seems to match our understanding 
of the principles and values of our Western 
liberal democracy – as if the ideals of public 
sphere were realisable, as if we could make 
public debate free and equal, as if the public 
deliberation could be at its best judged only 
on the basis of the best arguments, and as if 
the deliberation could eventually establish 
something like “the Truth” of the matter un-
der discussion. In this sense, the public sphere 
can act as a regulative idea against which we 
can measure democracy today.
As we are also familiar with, the Haber-
masian approach (or the common caricature 
that has often been painted of his original 
rather complex account) has been criticised 
from different directions. Some points of cri-
tique have been as follows (Calhoun 1992b; 
Fraser 1992; Roberts and Crossley 2004): 
• Historical arguments: Habermas’ ac-
count is historically idealized, and that 
there has never been such a phase in 
history as he claims. Also the public 
sphere as an ideal is based on a specific 
interpretation of certain national expe-
riences in Europe – namely, in Britain, 
and to some degree also in France and 
Germany; as such, it cannot be “trans-
planted” to other cultural and social en-
vironments.
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• Arguments of political theory type: 
Habermas’ claim that all communica-
tion is based on striving for consensus 
is too narrow and leads to the exclu-
sion of differences. The ideal democracy 
cannot be based on the claim towards 
homogeneity and consensualism – or 
achieving “the Truth” for that matter. 
The concept needs pluralisation – we 
should not speak of “a public sphere” 
or “the public sphere” but of plurality 
of public spheres, reflecting real diffe-
rences in the society. 
• Feminist critique: Habermas’ account 
only universalises the gender-based 
distinction between the male-domi-
nated public sphere and female private 
sphere – and in this way it only justifies 
the patriarchal social order. 
• Another critical strand has criticized 
Habermas of being too “Hegelian”: that 
he takes the nation state as a natural 
framework in the way of historical prog-
ress, and does not seriously discuss the 
social, cultural and other differences 
both within and between the nation 
states. 
Habermas has answered to this critique 
in several instances (Habermas 1992), and 
since the 1970s he has transformed his own 
conception of the public sphere in many ways 
(Habermas 1996; Habermas 2006b). Ho-
wever, even after all this criticism and with 
all these qualifications, most of the critics still 
use the Habermas’ early conceptualisation 
of the public sphere also as their own criti-
cal normative point of reference in their own 
research – mostly because there has not been 
any other comparable historically argued 
framework for discussing these matters.
2.2 European Public Sphere  
as a “Hot Topic” 
As I described above, the European 
public sphere – more or less in its idealised 
Habermasian form – has been a subject of in-
creasing interest in the last ten years or so, at 
least if judged by the number of projects and 
by the amount of resources allocated. Why is 
this?
We can see two camps that have ap-
proached the European public sphere from 
different directions. Firstly, there are the 
“Eurocrats” or those European policy ma-
kers who are worried about the worsening le-
gitimacy crisis of the EU and its institutions. 
The situation deteriorated especially after 
the European Constitution was rejected in 
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 
summer 2005. For this camp, the European 
public sphere is seen as a means to enhance 
and strengthen initiatives which may lead to 
more popular support to European integra-
tion. This is one explanation why the EU has 
directed money for research on the European 
public sphere; the wish is that the research 
would provide cure for the situation (Niemi-
nen 2007).
Secondly, from the scholarly side: there 
is a concern for Europe by quite a number of 
democratically minded scholars. What they 
see happening in Europe is the alarming in-
crease in disintegrative and antidemocratic 
tendencies, and growing social and political 
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divisions that the neo-liberal policies seem to 
increase. For this camp, the European public 
sphere represents an attempt to create new 
common political ground and to democratise 
European politics. Also, to many of them, the 
European public sphere is seen as promoting 
an antidote to the USA’s unilateral globalism: 
Europe should be given a voice of its own in 
the globalising world – and the presumption 
is that the European public sphere would then 
make it more reasoned and enlightened (Ha-
bermas and Derrida 2005; Habermas 2006a).
As there are so many different expecta-
tions towards the European public sphere, it 
is not always clear what different actors really 
mean or what kind of value-based expecta-
tions they have invested in this concept. There 
are a number of critical questions which can 
be directed to both the Eurocrats and the cri-
tical scholars. Some of them are: 
• What is the Europe that we are speaking 
of? There is no one Europe but there are 
always many different ones, depending 
on who and why is speaking; Europe is 
not a geographical entity, it is not a con-
tinent, as e.g. Asia, North- and South 
America, Australia are. Europe is a men-
tal and political construction, based on 
historical traditions (Cameron and Neal 
2003; Rietbergen 2006).
• Is the concept of the public sphere ap-
plicable to the European level at all? 
Originally the Habermasian concept 
was developed as an historical account 
of certain European nation states and 
their ways of industrialisation and de-
mocratization. Most empirical research 
has been performed on national scale. Is 
it feasible to try to transplant the concept 
from a national level to a trans-national 
level? (Fraser 2007).
• The national public sphere includes a 
strong popular national commitment. 
Can we imagine a popular commitment 
to Europe in the same way? Such con-
cepts as “identity”, “solidarity”, “recipro-
city”, and “trust” have been seen nece s-
sary for a national public sphere. How 
are they dealt with in the concepts of 
the European public sphere? (Calhoun 
2002).
• The national public spheres are strongly 
dependent on national linguistic com-
munities and national media systems. 
How are these restrictions thought to 
be solved within the framework of the 
European public sphere? (Schlesinger 
2003).
3. Four Approaches to the European 
Public Sphere 
The distinction between the Eurocrats 
and critical scholars presented above is rough 
enough to draw a general picture, but a more 
detailed approach is needed in order to un-
derstand the limitations of the imaginary 
 3 Here I use social imaginary in Charles Taylor’s sense: it is about “the ways people imagine their social exist-
ence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations 
that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 
2004; 23).
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behind the concept of the European public 
sphere.3 In the recent literature we can find 
four main ways in approaching the issue. In 
what follows they will be called the pragmatic, 
the processual, the sceptical, and the radical­
critical understandings of the European pub-
lic sphere.
3.1 Pragmatic or Affirmative Approach
This is characteristic to the European 
Commission way of thinking – in the Com-
mission’s documents, in the speeches of 
Commissars and Commission workers. This 
approach is exemplified in the White Paper on 
a European Communication Policy by the EC 
in February 2006, in the Plan­D for Democra­
cy, Dialogue and Debate in October 2005, and 
Communicating Europe in Partnership in Oc-
tober 2007 (White Paper on Communication 
2006; Plan-D 2005; Communicating Europe 
2007). The basic claim of this approach can be 
said to be that the elements for the European 
public sphere are there, the problem is in the 
execution of the European Union’s PR-work 
and communication. 
If the elements are there, who are to 
blame that the European public sphere does 
not seem to be working as it should be? Ac-
cording to the above mentioned documents, 
the guilt lies with the following factors: 
• the European Union’s own PR-work and 
communication have been deficient; 
• the long-standing and still continu-
ing blame game between the European 
Commission and the EU member states 
has given a bad image to the whole 
Union; 
• national politicians have scored cheap 
points by blaming the Brussels’ bureau-
crats of their own political failures, and 
vice versa;
• European media are not interested in all-
European issues and they give a wrong 
picture of what is important; European 
issues are not given enough emphasis and 
the media do not value them as the news.
What is needed to solve the situation are 
just practical things: we need to improve the 
execution of the European Union’s communi-
cation; we need to have better work with the 
media; we need to make the EU institutions 
more effective; we need to educate the com-
munication professionals and make them 
more skilful, etc. (Plan-D 2005; Period of Ref-
lection 2006; Communicating Europe 2007).
The problem with this approach is that 
it maintains a rather bureaucratic understan-
ding of communication and the public 
sphere. The main thing seems to be in get-
ting the message through, which represents a 
one-way model of communication. From this 
point of view, citizens seem to be important 
only to the degree that they can be activated 
to react to the initiatives from above, and by 
these means engaged into an organised dia-
logue – or consultation, as the EU-term goes.
3.2 Processual Approach
According to this line of thinking, we are 
on the road towards a democratic European 
public sphere, but although our direction is 
right, its realisation still needs much work. 
This approach appears typical, for example, 
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of more legally oriented scholars and political 
scientists. They are not satisfied of how things 
are today: they see that the existing European 
public sphere is still too elitist and dependent 
on the elite media. We can, however, observe 
clear progress towards the real European-
wide public sphere. This was exemplified, 
among others, in the European Union’s con-
stitutional process in the early years of the 
2000s that included many encouraging deli-
berative elements (Eriksson 2005).
According to many proponents of this 
approach, in order to develop into more de-
mocratic direction, the European public 
sphere requires better and legally binding 
rules and procedures. For this purpose the Eu-
ropean constitution is a necessity. A widely ac-
cepted notion is also a distinction between dif-
ferent functional levels of the public sphere: 
• there are “weak” or general publics, con-
sisting of people’s everyday communica-
tion; this level is not politically oriented;
• there are segmented publics, which are 
mainly issue based and aimed at influen-
cing political decision makers; this level 
includes social movements and civic ac-
tivities, etc; 
• there are strong publics of decision ma-
kers, embodied by such institutional 
fora as the European Parliament and the 
European Conventions (Eriksen 2005; 
Eriksen 2007).
The European Union’s legitimacy crisis 
shows that today the distance between the seg-
mented publics and the strong publics is much 
too wide. The issues which are discussed and 
problematised in the segmented public spheres 
cannot penetrate or reach the realities of the 
strong public spheres: the effective interlinks 
are missing (Eriksen 2005; Eriksen 2007).
The problem of this processual approach 
is that it is far too abstract. There seems to be 
no effective answers on how to strengthen the 
missing interlinks and how to promote the 
procedures which are necessary for a func-
tioning democratic European public sphere. 
3.3 Sceptical Approach
 The proponents of this strand of thought 
are not confident at all that we are on the right 
track, and that the democratic European pub-
lic sphere will follow as a natural result of Eu-
ropean development. This approach is mainly 
represented by social and cultural theorists 
and media scholars. They see that Europe is 
more characterized by disintegration than 
integration today, and more disunity than 
unity. According to this approach, structural 
changes are necessary in Europe, otherwise 
the case for a more democratic Europe is lost. 
The European Union and other existing Eu-
ropean structures as they are today are seen 
as forming more obstacles than acting as fa-
cilitators in the way towards a democratic Eu-
ropean public sphere (Levy et al., 2005).
The sceptical strand also includes empha-
sis that the Europeans should defend their so-
cial and cultural traditions and achievements 
better. The European liberal-democratic 
legacy is in danger: the European way of thin-
king on social, cultural and political issues is 
endangered by the USA-led neo-liberal and 
neo-conservative global agendas. What Eu-
rope needs is a global strategy of its own. Such 
 17
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2008/3 (23), ISSN 1392-3358 Viešųjų (nacionalinių) erdvių europėjimas
issues as environment, immigration, globali-
sation, and security can only be tackled with 
global cooperation, and Europe should lead 
the way (Habermas 2006; Levy et al., 2005).
What this new European sense of global 
responsibility requires is common European 
identity, not in a sense that it would super-
sede other sources of identity, but as an ad-
ditional dimension. Its emergence will be a 
slow but necessary process, and it will be also 
very uneven: some nations are more ready 
and willing to adopt a wider European iden-
tity than some others (Habermas and Derrida 
2005; Habermas 2006c).
The democratic re-instituting of Europe 
cannot take place without major structural 
changes, such as the democratic European 
constitution and the creation of effective Eu-
ropean citizenship. This, however, requires a 
fundamental re-definition of the European 
Union’s basic dynamics: instead of economy, 
human and social values must be put to the 
forefront in the European Union’s policies. 
This would mean to challenge the basic po-
wer relations in Europe as they are today 
(Habermas 2006a). 
The problem of the sceptical approach is 
its embedded social and cultural pessimism. 
It is very difficult to discern an optimistic 
positive political programme that would con-
vince us of the democratic potentialities of 
today’s European reality.
 
3.4 Radical-Critical Approach
Basically, the proponents of this ap-
proach are saying that the European public 
sphere is a wrong answer to a wrong ques-
tion, and that it is based on an old fashioned 
way of political thinking. For them, the Eu-
ropean public sphere represents the infamous 
idea of creating unity from above, and from 
this it follows that it promotes centralised and 
universalistic thinking. It is necessary to re-
cognise that instead of consensus, the basis of 
politics is always conflict – there are different 
interests which need to be negotiated – and 
it is always conflictual or agonistic (Mouffe 
2002).
The basic thing is that first we have to 
recognise the differences: politics can start 
only after we have recognised the differen-
ces, i.e. the real choices on which we have to 
choose and decide. Differences are not some-
thing that should only be tolerated by the ma-
jority, but they are the constitutive factor of 
all politics.
The problem with the concept of public 
sphere is that it exemplifies a top-down model 
of politics. Instead of genuine plura lism and 
the recognition of differences, it promotes 
forced homogeneity. From the point of view of 
the radical-critical approach, the whole con-
cept of public sphere should be rejected. In-
stead of talking about a or the public sphere – 
or even in plural public spheres – we should 
use the concept of public space and spaces, as 
they refer to something that is less normative 
and more open to conflicts and contestations 
(Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006).
3.5 Criticism: Two Types of Fallacies
The main problem with the different ap-
proaches presented above is that they all are 
still tied too much to a nation state type of 
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social and cultural imaginary. At least the 
three first mentioned approaches appear to 
be stuck with certain Euro-essentialism or 
idealisation of Europe: as if Europe could 
act as a one polity; as if it could or should 
form a one unified political entity – following 
the way that the European nation states are 
thought to be acting. 
The problem is, however, that European 
nation states don’t function that way, like uni-
fied political entities, at least according to to-
day’s democratic criteria. This is obvious, e.g. 
with Germany, the UK, France, the Nether-
lands, etc: instead of unified entities, they are 
suffering from continuous social and cultural 
tensions. European politics are today increa-
singly conflictual and unstable. There are no 
natural national identities, no self-evident 
feelings of solidarity, no inclusive national 
media – all these attributes have been chal-
lenged today.
From the point of view of the ideal no-
tion of the European public sphere, the prob-
lem is that if the nation state way of social 
and cultural imaginary does not work well 
on the national state level in today’s Europe, 
as there are legitimacy crises everywhere, 
how do we think these centralised structures 
would function on the European level? (Fra-
ser 2007). 
Moreover, the fourth approach – the ra-
dical-democratic approach – also seems to 
suffer from the same kind of a nation state type 
of bias. It seems that the differences, whose re-
cognition the proponents of radical democ-
racy call for, are actually the results of the na-
tion state way of imagining polity and political 
sphere. The question is who, in the first hand, 
is to set the rules and policies for recognition? 
From where does this authority receive his or 
her authority? And what happens after the 
differences are recognised – how is the nego-
tiation between different recognised parties 
arranged, who sets the rules and who acts as 
the arbiter? How will the outcomes be derived 
from the contestation, and who is to judge 
what compromises are valid and acceptable 
and which not? – It seems that answers to all 
these questions necessarily concern the struc-
tures and institutions of the national polity. 
4. Another Approach: Europe as Social 
and Cultural Networks
Next, an example of what is here called 
Euro-essentialism will be presented. An of-
ten used way to define the European public 
sphere is the following (Risse and Van de 
Steeg 2003):4
“An ideal typical European public sphere 
would then emerge 
1. if and when the same (European) themes 
are discussed at the same time at similar 
levels of attention across national public 
spheres and media; 
2. if and when similar frames of reference, 
meaning structures, and patterns of inter-
pretation are used across national public 
spheres and media; 
4 Same type of definition has been used also e.g. by European Commission Vice President Margot Wallström. 
See Wallström 2007. 
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3. if and when a transnational community 
of communication emerges in which 
speakers and listeners not only observe 
each other across national spaces, but 
also recognize that “Europe” is an issue 
of common concern for them.” 
What makes this definition problematic 
is the notion of the national public sphere, 
presented here as un-problematical and non-
contested, seemingly following the Haberma-
sian ideal notion. The logic seems to be that, 
first, we should have national public spheres 
in different or in all European countries – 
which, by definition, must first fulfil the ba-
sic conditions described above, so that they 
can then together create the European public 
sphere. 
The problem is, though, that we don’t 
find anywhere such national public spheres 
that would fit into the model pictured above. 
The themes are not nationally discussed at the 
same time at similar levels of attention; there 
are no similar national frames of reference 
and patterns of interpretation which would 
be shared by the whole population; and there 
are a number of ways of defining and under-
standing what the “nation” means to different 
social and cultural groups in any nation.5 
4.1 A Network Perspective
As argued above, another way to ima-
gine public spheres is to think of them as 
social and cultural networks. According to 
this approach, Europe has always existed in 
the form of multiple social and cultural net-
works: long before the birth of European na-
tion states there were local, regional, transna-
tional, trans-regional, and global networks 
that connected different people in different 
parts of Europe both between themselves and 
with the rest of the world. 
The concept of a network has recently 
been employed in several different ways in 
social sciences. One branch is represented 
by Manuel Castells’ technologically informed 
network theory. Another is the actor-net-
work-theory (ANT) developed especially by 
Bruno Latour. The third direction is more a 
methodological approach represented by the 
network analysis as a method. Different ap-
plications of network theory are utilised in 
political science; and so on.6 
The network is understood here in a wide 
sense. Basically, a network consists of more 
or less regular connections between people; 
these connections are motivated by different 
things – personal, social, cultural, economic, 
etc.; the regularity brings about certain con-
ventions and rules which then characterise 
the network and bring more institutionalised 
features to it; etc. In other words, social and 
cultural networks are historically evolved 
chains of human interaction, which have cer-
tain regulative effect upon our ways of living, 
thinking, and acting. 
5 One of the most perceptive criticisms to this direction has been put forward by Nancy Fraser, who in her recent 
article maintains that our ways of speaking the public sphere suffers of – what she calls – “Westphalian-national 
presuppositions of the classical theory of the public sphere”. See Fraser 2005; 2007.
6 A good overview on different uses of network is in Knox, Savage & Harvey 2005. See also e.g. Contractor 2003; 
Cook, Cheshire & Gerbasi 2006; Degenne & Forsé 1999; Law 1992; Stalder 2006.
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4.2 Three Takes on Networks
As stated above, the problem with much 
of the research on the European public sphere 
derives from its type of normative critique. It 
tends to be based on an ideal notion of the 
public sphere, against which the reality is 
then measured. From “reality” only such 
features are selected that either match or do 
not match with the ideal criteria. To reiterate 
the criticism of the attempts to establish the 
European public sphere or multiple spheres 
through critical research, three basic argu-
ments are provided:
• Firstly, there is no European public as 
such, but a vast number of local, region-
al, national and transnational publics; 
they do not necessarily correlate, they 
are not necessarily corresponding, and 
they are not necessarily commensurate 
in size, extent or duration.
• Secondly, there are no European media 
or common communication infrastruc-
ture, but there is a plethora of local, 
regional, national and transnational 
media that seldom follow the same po-
litical, ideological, religious, and cultur-
al agenda. 
• Thirdly, there are no commonly shared 
and accepted pan-European frames of 
reference or patterns of interpretation, 
and as Europe is becoming more and 
more genuinely multi-cultural, it is very 
difficult to see a way to establish such 
frames and patterns.
The notion of Europe of social and cul-
tural networks tries to overcome these prob-
lems by abandoning the embedded norma-
tive mode of criticism derived from the ideal 
notion of the public sphere, but trying at the 
same time to save its democratic core. In the 
following, the network approach will be dis-
cussed from three perspectives: from histori-
cal, sociological, and political perspectives. 
1) Historically
The basic claim here is that it was net-
works that created Europe; even before there 
was an idea of what Europe is about, there 
was an infrastructure of trans-European 
cooperation and communication based on 
different kinds of networks. According to 
this approach, Europe has always existed in 
the form of multiple social and cultural net-
works – local, regional, transnational, trans-
regional, semi-global, etc.7
Some of the earliest networks that can 
be called European, in the late-modern sense 
of the word, were commercial. In the Middle 
Ages trade relations started to get established 
and regular commercial institutions started 
to emerge. European trade routes developed 
and institutionalised (e.g. The Hanseatic 
League was established in 1157; the great 
European financier families started to rise to 
power – the Fuggers, the Medicis, the de la 
Poles). Europe began to get shape in the form 
of a rather loose economic network, consis-
ting of several regional bases. 
The church developed into the most in-
fluential network of networks in the Middle 
7  Among the sources for this historical account are: Jordan 2002; Jordan 2002; Cameron & Neal 2003; Power 
2006; Rietbergen 2006; Sprout 1994; Wilson & van der Dussen 1999.
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Ages. The Roman Catholic Church was the 
first to establish a trans-European system 
of governance. By AD 1000 most of Europe 
was “Christianised”, leaving only the most 
Northern parts (Scandinavia and the Baltic 
lands) to be Christianised later in the Mid-
dle Ages. The power of the Church – both the 
Western Catholicism and the Eastern Ortho-
doxy – was not seriously challenged until the 
Western reformation movement in the 16th 
century and the Church gradually started to 
fragment into several competing networks.
European networks of literate elite also 
started to evolve. Several European univer-
sities and academies of letters were estab-
lished during the High and Late Middle Ages. 
Universities and academic scholars formed 
widely influential and very active networks 
which were really trans-national in character. 
The University of Bologna was established in 
1088, the University of Paris in 1100, and the 
University of Oxford in the 11th century. The 
famous scholars of the times followed closely 
the developments in science and communi-
cated actively, not only by letters but also vis-
iting each other regularly.
Trades and crafts networks also deve-
loped in the Middle Ages. The tradition of 
apprentices and artisans – blacksmiths, ma-
sons, printers, cabinetmakers, etc. – travelling 
around Europe in order to gain new skills and 
to become competent for a trade master be-
came established. Also the multiple networks 
of arts and culture flourished: writers, paint-
ers, travelling musicians, theatre groups, tra-
velling performers, etc. have all been the part 
of the long history of Europe of networks.
From the point of view of the network 
approach, what is noteworthy is that these net-
works developed and functioned, firstly, with-
out a pan-European language: Latin, French, 
German, and other languages were used, de-
pending on the network; secondly, without a 
pan-European identity: the shared frames of 
reference were those adopted as a part of the 
membership of a network; and thirdly, with-
out a pan-European system of communica-
tion: each network developed a functional way 
of communicating both within the network 
and between the other networks of their own. 
2) Sociologically
The description above concerns what 
can be called functional networks that de-
veloped in time from local and regional net-
works to much wider and even transnational 
structures. Of course, not all networks are 
like this: different networks serve different 
purposes. We can initially make a rough divi-
sion between four or five types of networks 
relevant to our purposes here:8
1. Primary or formative networks, which 
concern our primary engagements to society 
and the world in general (micro level). We are 
born into social and cultural networks, and 
our way of living is networking. Our primary 
identification takes place within and through 
a close network of family; emotionally, we – 
or most of us, at least – belong to the network 
of our family and kin members, or extended 
family network. On this level we are left very 
8 This model is partly inspired by the discussion in Knox, Savage & Harvey, 2005. 
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little room for negotiating our own room and 
role within the network. We have to adapt – 
or break out.
2. Societal networks (semi-meso level), 
which concern our formal socialisation and 
membership of a formal community, such as 
networks based on professional or educatio-
nal relationships, but also include networks 
based on shared living environments – i.e. 
neighbourhood networks. As these relations 
are usually based on our organisational or 
institutional roles, they are mostly non-nego-
tiable as long as we occupy those particular 
roles; but they can be re-negotiated or dis-
pensed if and when we leave the roles, for 
example, when changing the profession or 
when retiring. As role-based networks, they 
can be utilised in different ways, which means 
that although their membership is principally 
non-negotiable, the way how they are used 
can be very flexible. 
3. Associational networks (meso level) 
are based on voluntary and free time associa-
tions (e.g. hobby related) or they can be based 
on work place relations. Although the mem-
bership in these kind of networks is condi-
tional to the availability of opportunities (the 
selection of potential hobbies can be restric-
ted in many ways; the availability of free time 
associations can be limited; the work environ-
ments are different, and there are a number of 
people permanently out of work), member-
ship in these networks is usual ly based more 
on choice: we can regulate, at least to a cer-
tain degree, our commitment to these types 
of networks. 
4. Issue or interest based networks crea-
te another level (semi-macro level), whose 
character is defined by their aim to influence 
the decision making. This links these net-
works to political will formation and thus to 
the political realm. These networks can be, 
for example, party political, professional or 
trade based, ideological or religious in nature. 
Characteristically these networks are based 
on voluntary membership and high level of 
personal commitment. 
5. Imposed networks (macro level), 
which concern us as citizens or the mem-
bers of the political nation. The membership 
of these networks is non-negotiable, which 
means that we share certain basic duties and 
rights with all the other members which in 
normal circumstances cannot be waived. It 
seems important to make a clear distinction 
between the formal structure of the institu-
tion which gives the frame for the network 
and the real network: for example, in Finland 
all young men are conscripted and thus insti-
tutionalised in the Finnish Defence Forces 
(FDF). The FDF gives cultural and social 
frames for the network: it regulates the issues 
and activities of the network, but the mea-
ning and va lues that the network embodies 
are created by the members. 
Principally, we live our social and cul-
tural lives in and through these networks. We 
cannot escape them even if we try. To a great 
extent it is not accidental at all to what kind 
of networks we belong to or are members of: 
there are selective mechanisms, inclusive and 
exclusive as well, which regulate our access to 
different networks. The selective mechanisms 
are manifold: they are based, for example, on 
class, gender, ethnicity, education, area of re-
sidence, cultural background, and so on. 
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3) Politically
From this point of view, we can also ask 
if the emergence of public government and 
the basic function of public structures – local 
government, nation states, regional and inter-
national organizations – can be interpreted 
as resulting from the need of different net-
works to exercise cooperation. The networks 
that operate in the same geographical area 
or region must necessarily take each other 
into consideration and develop at least some 
degree of cooperation, as they have to share 
the same geographical area or certain basic 
resources – such as water, living area, roads, 
energy sources, location of market places, etc. 
In order to solve the competing claims peace-
fully the networks have to create a system of 
negotiation and coordination of action, i.e. a 
system of common government. 
From the point of view of network hy-
pothesis this can be seen as the start of local 
and regional governance: it emerged first and 
foremost in order to coordinate the use of 
common resources and to arrange negotia-
tions between competing claims and interests 
by the networks. A developmental line from 
the medieval city councils to local or munici-
pal authorities of today might be detected 
here. Applied to the national level, national 
states can be understood as intersections of 
different networks (embodied first, for ex-
ample, in the King’s councils, later in history 
in political parties and lobby networks orga-
nised as state governments), established in 
order to negotiate their conflicting interests 
and to help in coordinating the use of com-
mon resources in matters concerning the use 
of resources on the level of the national state. 
However, an important qualification must 
be mentioned here: in all matters other than 
concerning the direct interests of the emer-
ging national state, the networks were origi-
nally meant to be autonomous and self-re-
gulating, such as in the areas of international 
trade, political and ideological movements, 
religious issues, etc. 
Thus, instead of an open, ideal-type of 
public sphere and critical debate aiming at 
consensus, what we have on the national level 
is a space for public negotiation between or-
ganised interests, restricted and regulated ac-
cording to the issues and themes which are 
of national character. From this perspective, 
public political structures – such as local 
governments and nation states – can be seen 
as “knots” or intersections between the net-
works that operate on a that particular geo-
graphical level: there are issues that need to 
be coordinated between different networks – 
economy, social security, energy, immigra-
tion, environment, etc. The European Union 
can also be seen as a crossroad or an inter-
section of a multiplicity of transnational Eu-
ropean networks, connected with common 
European issues. From this perspective, also 
the European Union can be understood as an 
intersection whose function is to coordinate 
the use of common resources, and for this 
purpose, to arrange negotiations between dif-
ferent competing interests. 
What does all this mean from the point 
of view of an individual member of society? 
Just to make a brief re-instatement: people’s 
primary engagement to society and culture 
is always through their memberships in dif-
ferent networks; and their understanding of 
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citizenship and citizenry is always interpreted 
in the first hand through these communities 
of interpretation. 
5. Conclusions: Networks and  
the Public Sphere
Where does this approach leave then the 
concept of the public sphere? What it allows 
us to do is to see more clearly the conditions 
for the normative application of the notion 
of the public sphere: what we should do and 
what we should not do with it. What it does 
not mean, however, is that we should totally 
abandon the public sphere as a normative re-
gulative principle. Instead, it seems to suggest 
that we should direct our attention to a more 
procedural concept of the public sphere.
As we observe now the society consis-
ting of a multiplicity of networks, we can see 
that some networks are more democratic and 
equal than others. It does not appear realis-
tic to imagine that there would be much in 
common that all the networks would share – 
such as universal values or norms or beliefs. 
All modes of networks – from kin networks 
to religious, professional and political net-
works – are based on some kind of member-
ship, which necessarily brings about rules 
of exclusion and inclusion. In certain issues 
many of the networks can potentially find 
common interest and ground for negotiation; 
in many or perhaps most issues this would not 
be the case. Thus, it does not appear rea listic 
to set the ideal-normative model of the public 
sphere as a general model for the socie ty con-
sisting of networks. 
If we now would like to re-introduce the 
concept of the public sphere within the frame-
work of the network approach, the public 
sphere would perhaps best be understood as 
a space or spaces of negotiation between dif-
ferent networks. In the course of negotiation 
process, each network brings publicly out its 
interest-based claims, and the public discourse 
is then about negotiating between compe ting 
claims. The result is always some sort of a 
compromise, balancing competing interests. 
This inevitably raises the question of power: 
the networks are not equal in relation to their 
negotiation competence, that is, in their abil-
ity to influence the resulting compromise. 
Some networks have more resources and po-
tential to influence the result while some net-
works are without such resources and thus are 
left with little or none negotiation power. The 
question of power, then, remains unsolved. 
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ABSTRACT 
The main argument in this article is that instead of attempting to establish the existence or the non-
existence of the European public sphere or public spheres, we could think of Europe as consisting of a 
multiplicity of networks, each having a public sphere or spheres of their own. The idea of seeing the public 
sphere from the point of view of networks is critical to the traditional Habermasian idea of conceiving the 
public sphere as something intrinsically restricted to national boundaries. 
The social and cultural networks operate in all areas of life. They have developed, transformed, and 
vastly expanded in time. It is difficult to make clear distinctions between different networks today as they 
can operate locally, nationally, trans-nationally, regionally, trans-regionally as well as globally. However, 
from the point of view of democratic theory it is still important to make a separation between these diffe-
rent spatial embodiments of the networks as they all indicate different modalities for democratic polities. 
Democracy needs to be thought differently on a local or national scale than on the trans-national or global 
scale. The idea of seeing the public sphere from the point of view of networks is critical to the traditional 
idea of conceiving the public sphere as something intrinsically restricted to national boundaries.
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